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1. Introductory 
THE MAIN PART OF this paper is a semantic analysis of the colloquial 
Israeli Hebrew words gam ("also"), rak ("only"), aji/u ("even"), and 
davka ("despite, nothing but"), 1 and a discussion of various constraints 
on syntactic use or semantic interpretation, which we claim to be 
motivated by the semantic properties and relations described in this 
semantic analysis. The above-mentioned forms are given the common 
label range-indicators (Rls). Our reasons for having chosen this label are 
discussed in Section 2 below. 
We hope this paper will prove a contribution not only to modern 
Hebrew linguistics but also to general theoretical linguistics, as its seman-
tic part includes theoretical and descriptive points that seem to be rele-
vant to the linguistic analysis of other, possibly all, languages. 
l. The English glosses are provided here just for the reader·s general orientation. No 
claim is made as to their adequacy as translations of the Hebrew words. 
29 
30 SHLOMO ARIEL and TAMAR KATRIEL 
2. On the Notion of Range-Indicators 
Our main motivation for classifying the forms under investigation un-
der the single label range-indicators is semantic, not syntactic. These 
items do share some syntactic properties. 2 But it is their semantics, rather 
than their syntax, that motivated us to study them as a single group. All 
four of them share a certain semantic property, which we shall 
characterize as soon as we have made our terminology clear. 
The range of a predicate will be defined as the set of elements to which 
the predicate could potentially apply. 3 Thus, the range of the predicate 
eat includes all animate beings (as "eaters") and all edible substances (as 
"eaten"). If a predicate has more than one place (as is the case with eat), 
its range is an ordered set of subranges. Thus, the range of eat is an 
ordered set of two subranges: subrange I (the set of eaters) and subrange 
2 (the set of edible substances). 
Most predicates share their range with other predicates. Thus, the 
range of eat overlaps with the range of touch, as most "eaters" are also 
"touchers" and most edible substances are also touchable. 
Now there are certain linguistic expressions whose semantic effect is 
such that a sentence containing them makes implicit reference to that 
portion of the range which is not explicitly mentioned in it. These are the 
expressions that we label "range-indicators" (Rls). Consider, for in-
stance, the two sentences: 
(I) yosef axal banana. ("Joseph ate a banana.") 
(2) yosef axal gam banana. ("Joseph ate a banana too.") 
In sentence (I) no reference is made to any elements of the range of 
the predicate axal ("ate") besides those that are explicitly mentioned in 
the sentence itself (namely, the elements "Joseph" and "a banana"). 
Sentence (2), on the other hand, contains an RI, namely gam ("also"), 
2. For example, all of them can form a part of every major constituent: 
Noun Phrase: ani roce [gam, rak, davka, afiluj sney 1apuxim. ("I want (also, only,nothing 
but. even) two apples.") 
Verb Phrase: hu [gam, rak, davka, ajilull axal. ("He [also, only, unexpectedly, even} ate.") 
Adverbial Phrase: hu raa ota {gam, rak. davka. ajiluj lifney §vuayim. ("He saw her (also, on· 
ly, at no other time than, even] two weeks ago.") 
Each of them precedes numerals, determiners and adjectives. They all differ from 
sentence adverbials such as kanire ("probably") and bexol zot ("even so") in that they can-
not be shifted around in the sentence optionally without affecting its meaning substantially, 
etc. 
3. Cf. Keenan (1973). 
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which contributes an implicit reference to that portion of the second sub-
range of the predicate axal ("ate") that is not explicitly mentioned in the 
sentence itself. What is implied about that other portion of the second 
subrange is that the predicate axal applies to at least one other member of 
it, too. 
Now let us consider a slightly more complex example. 
(3) yosef bikes gam banana. ("Joseph asked for a banana, too.") 
This sentence may be interpreted along the same lines as sentence (2), 
that is, it may be understood to imply that Joseph asked for something 
besides a banana, something that is not explicitly mentioned in sentence 
(3) itself. But in certain contexts a different interpretation would be ap-
propriate. According to this different interpretation. sentence (3) would 
not convey the information that Joseph asked for something else besides 
a banana, but, say, that he was given something else (e.g. an apple) 
without necessarily having asked for it, and then asked, in addition to 
what was given to him, for a banana. This is the interpretation that 
manifests itself, for instance, in sentence (4): 
(4) yosef kibel tapuax veaxarey xen bikd gam banana. ("'Joseph was 
given an apple and afterwards he asked for a banana too.") 
Now consider a yet more subtle case: 
(5) ani makir gam mifehu feyuxai /aa::or iexa bestatistika. ("I know 
also someone who could help you with your statistics.") 
Sentence (5) may be interpreted to imply that the speaker knows 
another person (different from the one he explicitly refers to in the 
sentence as one who could help the addressee with his statistics). But in 
some contexts it could have another interpretation, according tow hich it 
is not implied that the speaker is familiar with another person of a 
specific description, but just that the speaker was informed of the ex-
istence of such a person. This other interpretation could be given to (5) 
when it is used, for instance, as a response to sentence (6). 
(6) macati mifehu feyuxal laazor Ii bealgebra. ("I've found someone 
who could help me with my algebra.") 
As can be gathered from sentences (3)-(6) and the accompanying dis-
cussion, it is not at all a simple matter to capture the general principles 
which would predict in each particular case what is the predicate to 
whose range an RI refers. An explicit formulation of such general princi-
ples would supposedly require going into a complex of presently poorly 
understood areas of syntax, semantics and pragmatics. This, like so many 
present problems in linguistics, must await further research results. 
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Without going further into this question, we may, in conclusion of 
this section, state that Rls are expressions that share the semantic 
property of range indication, which will be defined as follows: 
Let R be the range of a predicate Pin a sentence S. Let R• be the range of 
another predicate P', where P• is not necessarily in S, and P and P• share at 
least one semantic feature (so that C = R n R•, and C is not empty). (Cf. 
Green, 1968.) 
An RI in S indicates, by implication, whether P or P• does or does not 
apply to elements of R or C that are not in S. 
No claim is made in this paper that the words gam, rak, ajilu, and 
davka are the only Rls in colloquial Israeli Hebrew. There are other 
forms that exhibit the semantic property of Range Indication, e.g. od 
("more, another, else"), iuv ("again"), adayin ("still"), kvar ("already"), 
etc. The reason we restricted ourselves to these forms is that they seem to 
constitute a relatively homogenous subset of the set of Rls. This 
homogeneous impression is due to the symmetrical semantic structure of 
this subset (cf. Table I). 
3. Semantic Analysis of Colloquial Israeli Hebrew Rls 
3. I Semantic dimensions 
The meaning of Rls will be described in terms of three semantic 
dimensions: 
I. Type of Range Indication 
11. Assertion vs. Presupposition status of logical and pragmatic con-
sequences 
III. Modality (consequence counter-expected) 
The dimension of Range-Indication was discussed in Section 2 above. 
We will refer to the logical notions of assertion and presupposition as 
defined by Keenan (1973) in his three-valued Proposed Logic (PL): 
Definition I: "A PL sentence S (logically} presupposes a sentence T 
just in case S is assigned value zero in every in-
terpretation in which T is not asigned value true" 
(Keenan, 1973, p. 346}. 
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Definition 2: "A PL sentence S (logically) entails a PL sentence T 
just in case Tis true in every interpretation in which S 
is true. In such a case T is called a (logical) conse-
quence of S" (p. 352). 
Definition 3: "A PL sentence S (logically) asserts a PL sentence T 
just in case S entails T but S does not presuppose T" 
(p. 352). 
The assertions of a sentence, then, are those sentences which must 
hold for it to be true, but need not hold when S is false. while its presup-
positions must hold for the sentence to be either true or false. If one of its 
presuppositions is not true, then the sentence is assigned truth value zero. 
In order to make the concepts assertion and presupposition useful for 
our present analysis, we must vary their original definitions to ac-
comodate pragmatic relations like, for instance, the relation between 
sentence (3) and its context-dependent (logical-pragmatic) consequence 
"Joseph was given something else" (cf. sentence (4)). The only thing re-
quired to adapt Keenan's definitions to our needs is to add to them a 
clause that will restrict their application to a particular interpretation in a 
particular context. Our use of the terms assertion and presupposition 
below should be understood to be based on such an extended definition. 
The semantic dimension assertion vs. presupposition status of logical 
consequences will be defined as follows: 
Let a sentence S, containing an RI, have, among its logical-pragmatic con-
sequences, T and T', where T· takes into account the meaning of the Rl.4 
Then the presently discussed semantic dimension has to do with the ques-
tion which of the two (T or T') is a presupposition of S, and which of the 
two is an assertion of S. 
For examples illustrating this semantic dimension see below. 
The semantic dimension of modality (consequence counter-expecte.:l) 
is the attitude of counter-expectation that the speaker who produces S (a 
sentence that contains an RI) has, or believes his audience to have, 
4. The notion "taking into account the meaning of ... " will not be given a rigorous 
definition here. However, by using sheer intuition one can realize, for instance, that (ii) 
below takes into account the meaning of the RI gam in (i), whereas (iii) does not. 
(i) gam yosef barax. ("Joseph ran away too.") 
(ii) od miiehu barax. ("Someone else ran away as well.") 
(iii) yosef rac. ("Joseph ran away.'') 
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towards that assertion or presupposition of S which is relevant to the in-
terpretation of the RI. A sentence containing an RI implies that the 
speaker did not expect, or believes his audience not to have expected, the 
assertion of his sentence, or the presupposition of his sentence, to become 
true. For instance, sentence (7) implies that the speaker did not expect, or 
believes the audience not to have expected, that Joseph would run away. 
(7) gam yosef barax. ("Joseph ran away too.") 
The main assertion of sentence (7) is yosef barax ("Joseph ran away"). 
We shall draw a distinction between absolute and relative counter-
expectation. If S implies just that the speaker did not expect, or believes 
the audience not to have expected, the consequence of S that is relevant 
to the interpretation of the RI to become true, then this counter-
expectation would be considered absolute. If S implies also that the 
speaker expected (or believes his audience to have expected) the relevant 
assertion of S to become true less than he expected (or believes his 
audience to have expected) the relevant presupposition of S to become 
true, or the other way around, that is, the presupposition less expected 
than the assertion, then this counter-expectation would be considered 
relative. 
The counter-expectation implied by sentence (7) is absolute. The 
counter-expectation of sentence (8), on the other hand, is relative: 
(8) afilu yosef barax. ("Even Joseph ran away.'') 
Sentence (8) implies that the speaker expected (or believes the 
audience to have expected) the assertion of (8) (namely, that Joseph 
would run away) to become true Jess than he expected (or believes the 
audience to have expected) the relevant presupposition of sentence (8) 
(namely, that some other people besides Joseph would run away) to 
become true. 
Sentences with an RI where the RI implies a relative counter-
expectation (e.g. sentence (8)) usually express an attitude of surprise, 
shock, etc. This is not usually the case with sentences with an RI, where 
the RI implies an absolute counter-expectation. The explanation for this 
seems to lie in the fact that a relative counter-expectation presupposes 
that something was positively expected and the expectation proved 
wrong (hence the surprise, disappointment, etc.), whereas an absolute 
counter-expectation does not presuppose that anything was positively ex-
pected in advance, only that something was not expected. Thus, sentence 
(8) presupposes that it was expected that some other person (not Joseph) 
would do the same as those who ran away, whereas sentence (7) does not 
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presuppose that any additional person would run away. 
Another distinction that seems relevant here is the distinction 
between the counter-expectation being a function of what might be cal-
led, for lack of better expression, the scope of the RI in the underlying 
logical representation of S versus its being also an inherent semantic 
feature of the RI. Let us use for the former the expression logical counter-
expectation and for the latter inherent counter-expectation. The counter-
expectation of gam is logical. The counter-expectation of ajilu is both 
logical and inherent. Thus, the counter-expectation of (7) seems to result 
solely from the fact that gam has the whole sentence as its scope in "the 
logical representation" of sentence (7). This could be expressed as [gam 
[yosef barax]J ("[Also [Joseph ran away]]"). In other words, "That 
Joseph ran away is also true." That is to say. gam is the logical predicate 
of sentence (7), i.e. it is the element that conveys the new information car-
ried by (7). The main point is that this information is new and it was not 
expected. gam, being a logical predicate. conveys information that was 
not expected, hence its logical counter-expectational value. ajilu in 
sentence (8) has the same value, but, on top of all that, it has the value of 
inherent counter-expectation; its re/atil'e counter-expectation feature is an 
integral part of its own se;nantic make-up and has nothing to do with its 
logical scope. 
3.2 Semantic definitions of colloquial Israeli Hebrew Rls 
We now proceed to propose a definition of the meaning of each RI, 
using the semantic dimensions discussed in Section 3.1. 
It should be pointed out, that our definitions do not embrace all the 
uses of the items under discussion. However, it seems to us that they 
could be revised so as to accomodate some uses that seem superficially to 
lie outside the scope of the definitions as given here. This will require 
further research.' 
In our definitions we shall use the following symbols: 
The symbol x will denote the scope constituent of an RI, that is, the 
referent of the constituent of which the RI forms a part in some deep 
5. Some preliminary work on the additional use of these Rls. as well as Hebrew od 
("more") is included in Katriel (1976). This paper is based in part on work done for that 
study. 
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representation.6 Thus, in sentence (9), x, the scope of gam, would be the 
proposition expressed by sentence ( 10), since a deep representation of (9) 
would look, in rough outline, like (PI). 
(9) ani roce gam lasir. ("I want also to sing.") 
(IO) ani asir. ("I shall sing.") 
(Pl) 
............. s----~ 
(Predicate) VP (Subject) NP 
NP.......----__ V 
S~RI I 6. I roce ani 
ani a.frr gam ("want") ('/") 
("I shall sing") ("also"') 
The other symbols in the following definitions will be the capital let-
ters used in Section 3.1, namely S (the sentence containing the RI); P (the 
predicate of that sentence); P• (another predicate, that shares a part of its 
range with P); R (the range of P); R' (the range of P'); C (the intersection 
of R and R'); and T (a logical-pragmatic consequence of S). 
Definition of gam: 
(i) Range-Indication - positive 
That is, P (or P') does apply to elements of R or C that are not men-
tioned in S. 
Examples: Sentence (7) has as one of its consequences that P (barax) 
or P' (some other predicate) applies to unspecified elements of R (the 
range of barax) or C (the common portion of the ranges of barax and P'). 
The fact that sentence (7) has as consequences sentence ( 11) and, in cer-
tain contexts, sentence ( 12), illustrates this informally. 
(11) od miSehu barax. ("Another person ran away as well.") 
( 12) hasomrim lo hiclixu litpos et david. ("The guards could not 
manage to catch David.") 
6. We shall not go into the question here of whether such deep representation would be 
deep slructure. semantic representation, or some other kind of underlying structure. 
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Sentence (9) implies that P (roce) or P' (some other predicate) applies 
to unspecified elements of R or C. Informally, sentence (9) may have as 
consequences sentence ( 13) and, in some contexts, sentence ( 14). 
(13) ani roce lirkod. ("I want to dance.") 
(14) ani holex lenagen maiehu. ("I'm going to play something.") 
(ii) Status of relevant logical-pragmatic consequences -
presupposition 
That is to say, the relevant logical-pragmatic consequence T' (where 
T· is the very consequence discussed above, namely, that P [or P'] applies 
to elements of R or C that are not in S) is a presupposition of S rather 
than an assertion of S. 
As a verification of this, one may regard the fact that T is implied to 
be true even when S is false. If sentence ( 11) is a T of sentence (7), and (7) 
is false (in other words, ( 15) is true), this does not imply that ( 11) is false. 
Quite the contrary, sentence (15), as well as (7), implies the truth of 
sentence ( 11 ). 
(15) ze lo naxon iegam yosef barax. ("It is not true that Joseph ran 
away too.") 
(iii) Modality (consequence counter-expected) - absolute logical 
counter-expectation of assertion 
gam contributes to S the modal consequence that the speaker did not 
expect (or believes the audience not to have expected) the relevant asser-
tion of S to become true. 
Sentence (7) implies that the speaker or the audience did not expect 
Joseph to run away (that is, that the main assertion, namely "Joseph ran 
away," was counter-expected). 
Definition of rak 
(i) Range-Indication - negative 
That is, P (or P1 ) does not apply to elements of R or C that are not 
mentioned in S. 
Thus, sentence (16) has as consequence sentence (17) and in some 
contexts, sentence (18). 
(16) rak yosef barax. ("Only Joseph ran away.") 
( 17) af exad axer lo barax. ("No one else ran away.") 
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(18) af exad axer lo nivhal. ("No one else got scared.") 
(ii) Status of relevant logical-pragmatic consequence - assertion 
That is to say, the relevant logical-pragmatic consequence T (where T 
is the very consequence discussed above, namely that P [or P'] does not 
apply to elements of R or C that are not in S) is an assertion of S rather 
than a presupposition of S. As a verification of this, one may regard the 
fact that T is implied to be false when S is false, e.g., the denial of 
sentence (16) implies the denial of (17). 
The difference between the presuppositional structure of gam and rak 
accounts for the fact that, although they are reversed in their range in-
dication, the negation of a rak sentence does not yield a corresponding 
gam sentence. Thus, the negation of (19) would not be semantically 
equivalent to (7): 
(19) Jo rak yosef barax. ("Not only Joseph ran away.") 
(iii) Modality (consequence counter-expected) - absolute counter-
expectation of assertion 
rak contributes to S the modal consequence that the speaker did not 
expect (or believes the audience not to have expected) the main assertion 
of S (that is, T above) to become true. For example, sentence ( 16) implies 
that {17) was not expected. 
In some contexts rak has the following semantic feature, which the 
other Rls discussed here lack. In such contexts the relevant elements of 
the range (R or C) are considered to be ordered along the same seman-
tically or pragmatically (extra-linguistically) determined scale, and x. the 
scope constituent of rak, is understood to be placed somewhere down the 
scale, usually below the (sometimes illusive) mid-point of the scale. The 
clearest of these kinds of contexts, perhaps, is in the case of N Ps contain-
ing numerals: 
(20) rak (s/ofa) anasim barxu. ("Only (three) people ran away.") 
Here the relevant elements of the range are ordered along the ordinal 
scale of natural numbers, and rak implies "no greater number than 
three," i.e., it takes the numeral in its scope. Sentence (21) demonstrates 
that gam, for instance, does not possess such a property. It takes the 
whole quantified NP in its scope. 
(21) gam (§Jo§a ana§im) barxu. ("(Three people) ran away too.") 
Sentence (21) does not imply anything about numerical ordering. It 
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only refers to a group of a given size, it does not restrict the size of the 
group. In this respect rak functions like a group of lexical items we could 
refer to as "qualifiers" which characteristically take quantifiers as their 
scope constituents (rather than a whole NP). Among them would be 
lefaxot ("at least"), /exol hayoter ("at most"), beerex ("more or less"), 
and bediyuk ("exactly"), as illustrated in (22) below. 
(22) Klefaxot, /exol hayoter, beerex, bediyuk] sneym asar anaiim 
barxu. ("KAt least, At most, More or less, Exactly] twelve people 
ran away.") 
In (23) rak presupposes a scale of relative prestige of various occupa-
tions, that is determined by extra-linguistic, social values. 
(23) hu rak pakid. ("He is only a clerk.") 
In (24), however, the scale is an internal hierarchy of clerks, hence the 
differences in acceptability. 
(24) hu rak pakid Kzutar, *baxirl("He is only a [junior, senior] of-
ficial.") 
Definition of ajilu 
(i) Range-indication - positive 
In this respect aji/u is equivalent to gam. Consider, therefore, 
sentences (7), (8), and (I I) below: 
(7) gam yosef barax. ("Joseph ran away too.") 
(8) ajilu yosef barax. ("Even Joseph ran away.") 
(11) od miiehu barax. ("Another person ran away as well.") 
Both sentences (7) and (8) imply sentence ( 11 ). 
(ii) Status of relevant logical-pragmatic consequence - presupposi-
tion 
ajilu is analogous to gam in this respect too. Just as the truth of 
sentence ( 11) is unaffected by whether (7) is true or false, the truth of 
sentence (11) (which, as mentioned above, serves as the T of (8), too) is 
unaffected by whether (8) is true or false. 
(iii) Modality (consequence counter-expected) - absolute logical 
and relative inherent counter-expectation of assertion 
That is to say, the assertion (e.g., yosef barax in sentence (8)) was less 
expected than the presupposition (e.g., sentence (11 )). 
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Definition of davka 
davka is equivalent to afilu in that both exhibit relative inherent 
counter-expectation, but in afilu it is the assertion that is least expected, 
whereas in davka it is the presupposition. 
Although, as mentioned above, our semantic analysis does not ac-
count for all the uses of the forms under discussion, it would be a con-
spicuous omission not to mention an additional modality feature that 
presents itself in some of the uses of davka-the feature of counter-
volition. Sentence (25), for instance, would be ordinarily interpreted to 
imply not just the version of counter-expectation discussed above, but 
also the speaker's irritation with the choice of Joseph for the job. 
(25) davka yosef kibel et haavoda. ("Of all other people, Joseph 
should be the one to have gotten the job.") 
The notion of counter-volition seems, intuitively, to be related to the 
notion of counter-expectation, but whether this intuition can be placed 
on a more systematic basis should remain for the time being an open 
question. 
(i) Range-indication - negative 
In this respect, davka is equivalent to rak. Just as sentence (16) implies 
( 17), sentence (26) implies (17): 
(26) davka yosef barax. 
(ii) Status of relevant logical-pragmatic consequence - assertion 
In this respect too, davka is equivalent to rak. Just as the denial of 
sentence (16) implies the denial of (17), the denial of (26) implies the 
denial of(l7). 
(iii) Modality (consequence counter-expected) - absolute logical 
and relative inherent counter-expectation of presupposition 
That is to say, the presupposition (e.g. yosef barax ("Joseph ran 
away")) in sentence (26) was less expected than the assertion (sentence 
( 17) ). 
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PRAGMA TIC CONSEQUENCE 
Table I: Semantic mapping of colloquial Israeli Hebrew Rls 
3.4 "Natural logical" universals in the semantics of Rls 
Two features of the semantic analysis presented above seem to be 
implicit (in terms of "natural" rather than formal logic) in certain other 
features. If this is so, the former should be dropped from the particular 
semantic analysis of colloquial Israeli Hebrew and promoted to universal 
semantics. 
The first feature is what we termed "non-inherent counter-
expectation" which, as mentioned above, seems to be implied by the 
"logical predicative" status of Rls. 
The second feature is the status of the logical-pragmatic consequence. 
The question whether the relevant logical-pragmatic consequence of S is 
an assertion or a presupposition seems to be totally determined (in terms 
of "natural logic") by the question whether the range-indication of the 
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RI in S is positive or negative. If the range-indication is positive, the con-
sequence should be a presupposition. If the range-indication is negative, 
the consequence should be an assertion. To see that this is so, consider 
the following: To assert that the range-indication of the Rl in S is positive 
is to assert that the set consisting of x is just a proper subset of R or C, 
e.g. the set consisting of Joseph in sentence (7) is just a subset of the set of 
elements to which P (the predicate barax ("ran away")) or P1 (some other 
predicate) applies. Now if S is denied, in other words, if it is asserted that 
P does not apply to x either (e.g. that barax ("ran away") does not apply 
to Joseph in sentence (7)), this does not necessarily imply that P (or P1 ) 
does not apply to elements of R or Cother than x. To put the same idea 
differently, the denial of S does not necessitate the denial of its relevant 
consequence. This consequence is, then, by definition a presupposition of 
S. 
On the other hand, the assertion that the range-indication of the Rl in 
S is negative implies that xis the sole element in R or C (e.g. in sentence 
(17) Joseph is the sole element to which P (barax) applies). If Sis denied, 
in other words, if it is asserted that P is not the sole element in R or C, 
this necessarily implies that there are other elements in R or C besides x. 
In other words, the denial of S necessitates the denial of its relevant con-
sequence. This consequence is, then, by definition, an assertion of S. 
4. Semantically Motivated Constraints on the Use of Rls in Colloquial 
Israeli Hebrew 
Since this is not a full syntactic analysis, we shall not go into the trans-
formational rules that relate the semantic representation with surface 
structure, but just point out various constraints on the use of Rls that 
seem to be motivated by specific features of the semantic analysis 
presented in Section 3. 
4.1 Constraints motivated by range-indication (and, by implication, by 
the relevant logical-pragmatic consequence) 
Cl: A positive range-indicator (gam, ajilu) does not co-occur with a 
negative range-indicator within the same constituent (rak, davka). 
(27) K*gam rak, *rak gam, *ajilu rak. *rak ajilu, *gam davka. *davka 
gam, *ajilu davka, *davka ajiluj yosef barax. 
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("ftAlso only, Only also, Even only, Only even, Also just, Just 
also, Even just, Just even] Joseph ran away.") 
This constraint seems to be due to the contradictory effect of putting 
together two logical predicates with opposite logical-pragmatic conse-
quences. 
C2: Two range-indicators with the same value (negative or positive) 
do not occur within the same constituent. 
(28) H*gam afilu, *afilu gam, *rak davka, *davka rak] yosef barax. 
("ftAlso even, Even also, Only just, Just only] Joseph ran away.") 
This constraint seems to be due to the redundancy that is effected by 
putting together two logical predicates which share a consequence. The 
use of rak and davka in such constituents is logically redundant. The use 
of gam and afilu creates a contradiction. 
C3: An RI is excluded from a constituent which contains an expres-
sion that is synonymous with an RI (at least with respect to range-
indication). 
(29) H*rak, *davka, *gam, *afilu} yosef bilvad barax. ("[Only, Just, 
Also, Even] Joseph alone ran away.") 
The explanation of this constraint is self-evident. 
C4: Rls are excluded from constituents which denote an x that is the 
only element in R (the range of P). 
(30) H*rak, *davka, *gam. *afilu] metim kamim litxiya. C'KOnly, Just, 
Also, Even] the dead resurrect.") 
rak metim kamim litxiya ("only the dead resurrect") is a tautology 
and may be used as part of an explanation of the meaning of kam litxiya 
("resurrect"). 
(31) rrak, *davka, *gam, *afilu]yosefhuhaifhaafirbeyoterbaolam. 
("IlOnly, Just, Also, EvenH Joseph is the richest man in the 
world.") 
C5: Rls are excluded from a constituent which denotes an x that is 
empty. 
(32) H*rak, *davka, *gam, *ajilu] af exad lo haya fam. ("[Only, Just, 
Also, Even] no one was there.") 
The dimension of range-indication presupposes that xis not empty, 
otherwise it would make no sense to ask whether P (or P•) applies just to 
x or also to elements of R or C besides x. 
C6: Rls are excluded from a constituent that refers to an x that in-
cludes the whole range of P. 
(33) rrak, *davka, *gam, *afilu] kol dayarey habayit haze garim bo. 
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("[Only, Just, Also, Even) all the occupants of this house live in 
it.") 
rak and davka are excluded because their negative range-indication 
would be redundant. gam and afllu are excluded because their positive 
range-indication would cause a contradiction. 
C7: Rls are excluded from a constituent which refers to an x that is 
not specific. 
(34) tizaher, rrak, *davka. *gam, *aflluj misehu alul /ehikanes. 
("Take care, [only, just, also, evenj someone might come in.") 
All range-indicators treated in this paper are specific, that is, they 
presuppose that xis specific. Compare sentences (34) and (35). In the lat-
ter the non-specific RI od ("else") is used: 
(35) tizaher, od miiehu alul lehikanes. ("Take care, someone else 
might come in.") 
C8: If a constituent includes one of the following expressions (which 
qualify an evaluation of the size of x): bediyuk ("exactly"), lefaxot ("at 
least"), lexol hayoter ("at most"), Rls obey the following cooccurence 
restrictions: 
I. Negative Rls (rak and davka) do not cooccur with bediyuk ("ex-
actly"). 
(36) hayu sam n*rak, *davkaj bediyuk asara psantranim. ("There were 
[only, just) exactly ten pianists there.") 
as compared with 
(37) hayu iam [gam, aflluj bediyuk asara psantranim. ("There were 
[also, evenn exactly ten pianists there.") 
Although afllu in (37) is of dubious acceptability, it is certainly less 
unacceptable than rak or davka. 
bediyuk seems to imply "no more and no less than." Negative Rls 
would introduce an element of redundancy, since negative range-
indication means "no more than" in context of sentences such as (36). 
II. Negative Rls do not cooccur with lefaxot ("at least"). 
(38) hayu 5am n* rak, *davkaj lefaxot asara psantranim. ("There were 
[only, jusfll at least ten pianists there.") 
lefaxot ("at least") implies "possibly more." This implication con-
tradicts the negative range-indication of rak ("only") and davka ("just"). 
111. Positive Rls do not co-occur with /exo/ hayoter ("at most"). 
(39) hayu Sam [*gam, *afiluH lexo/ hayoter asara psantranim. ("There 
were [also, even) at most ten pianists there.") 
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lexol hayoter ("at most") implies "no more than," and this con-
tradicts the positive range-indication of gam and afilu. 
C9: Rls are excluded from a constituent that contains excluding ex-
pressions such as milvad and xuc mi- ("except, besides"). 
(40) milvad rrak. *davka. *gam. *ajilu"j xatul [lo haya .Sam klum, 
hayu iam iney klavim"j. ("Except (only, just, also, even] a cat 
[there was nothing there, there were two dogs there].") 
Rls are either redundant or contradictory in this context. 
CIO: If the negative lo ("not") has gam ("also") in its scope, the 
sentence is unacceptable. If it has rak ("only") in its scope, the sentence is 
acceptable. 
(41) *lo gam yosef rakad. ("Not also Joseph danced.") 
(42) lo rak yosef rakad. ("Not only Joseph danced.") 
The explanation seems to lie in the fact that the relevant consequence 
of gam ("also") is a presupposition, whereas the relevant consequence of 
rak ("only") is an assertion. lo ("not") is used to deny an assertion rather 
than a presupposition (cf. the unacceptability of sentence (43)): 
(43) *lo beerex xamiiim anaiim nixnesu laxeder. ("Not about fifty 
people came into the room.") 
The relevant consequence of (43) seems to be a presupposition rather 
than an assertion. It would be something like "speaker does not know ex-
actly how many people came into the room." Sentences (44) and (45) 
seem to be unacceptable for the same kind of reason. 
(44) *lo davka yosef rakad. 7 ("Not just Joseph danced.") 
(45) *lo afilu yosef rakad. ("Not even Joseph danced.") 
Cf. constraints concerning cooccurrences of afilu and davka with 
sentence adverbials (in C 13 and discussion thereof). 
Cl 1: The scope of pro-forms, interpretation of questions, and other 
expressions that refer anaphorically to a constituent with an RI, etc., are 
partly determined by the value of its range-indication (and, by implica-
tion, by its status as assertion or presupposition). 
(46) A: kaniti [rak, davkaj tapuxim. ("I bought [only, just} apples.") 
B: ata tamid ose Ii et ze. ("You always do this to me.") 
(Response interpreted as "You never buy anything else.") 
(47) A: kaniti [gam, afilu] tapuxim. ("I bought [also, even) apples.") 
7. The idiomatic expression /av davka ("it is not necessarily so") is a different case 
altogether. 
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B: ata tam id ose Ii et ze. ("You always do this to me.") 
(Response interpreted as "You always buy apples on top of everything 
else.") 
(46a) A: kaniti [rak, davkaJ tapuxim. ("I bought [only, just» apples.") 
B: lama? ("Why?") 
(Question interpreted as "Why didn't you buy anything else?") 
(47a) A: kaniti [gam, ajiluJ tapuxim. ("I bought [also, even] apples.") 
B: lama? ("Why?") 
(Question interpreted as "Why did you buy apples on top of everything 
else?") 
(47b) A: kaniti gam tapuxim. ("I bought also apples.") 
B: vegam ma? ("And what else?") 
(46b) A: kaniti rak tapuxim. ("I bought only apples.") 
B: *verak ma? ("And only what?") 
Here the response is unacceptable because the form of the question 
presupposes that P applies to something else, which would contradict the 
negative range-indication of rak. 
4.2 Constraints motivated by modality 
CI 2: Embedding an S that contains an RI in a clause that refutes a 
counter-expectation is unacceptable. 
(48) af al pi iecipita lexax ff*rak, *davka, *gam, *afiluJ yosef rakad. 
("Even though you had expected it, [only, just, also, even] 
Joseph danced.") 
The refutation of counter-expectation that is implied by such expres-
sions contradicts the counter-expectation implicit in all Rls. 
Cl3: Inherent counter-expectational Rls sound awkward with 
sentence adverbials that express (as most sentence adverbials do) the at-
titude of the speaker towards the content of the sentence. 
(49) [kanire, lelo safek, beferus, . .. JI f,_*ajilu, *davka. gam, rakJ mose 
rakad. ("iSeemingly, No doubt, Certainly, ... J [even, just, 
also, only] Moshe danced.") 
The explanation for this constraint seems to lie in the fact that afilu 
and davka, being inherently counter-expectational (in other words, in-
herently refer to the speaker's attitude to the content of the sentence) 
naturally require the whole sentence to be their logical scope; that is, they 
naturally serve as logical predicates. Sentence adverbials, having a similar 
status, push them, as it were, out of this natural position, and this creates 
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the impression of awkwardness. On the other hand, gam and rak, which 
are not inherently counter-expectational, do not have such a natural 
claim for the status of a logical predicate that has the whole sentence as 
its scope, and therefore tolerate a sentence adverbial in this position. By 
way of reinforcing the above argument, notice that no such constraint 
seems to be at work when the adverbial and RI are not dominated by the 
same S-node in underlying structure as in (50). 
(50) [nire, eyn safekH ie-[afi/u, davkaH moie rakad. ("[It seems, 
There's no doubq that [even, out of all peopleH Moshe danced.") 
Cl4: rak does not occur with expressions that convey surprise at the 
exclusion of elements of R that are not in x from the extension of P. (The 
extension of a predicate is that portion of its range to which the predicate 
actually applies in a specific context. Cf. Keenan, 1973.) 
(51) yosef hitpale ie-[*rak, davkaD david rakad ve/o miiehu axer. 
("Joseph was surprised that [only, just} David was dancing and 
not someone else.") 
As the counter-expectation of rak is absolute, it does not imply a 
stronger expectation that someone else would dance than that David 
would dance. Therefore surprise at the refutation of such stronger expec-
tation is out of place. davka does imply such stronger expectation, so ex-
pression of surprise at its refutation is in order. 
Cl5: afi/u does not occur with expressions that convey surprise at the 
inclusion of elements of R that are not in x in the extension of P. 
(52) yosef hitpale ie-[*afilu, gam} david rakad vegam axoto ie/ david. 
("Joseph was surprised that [even, also} David danced and also 
David's sister.") 
The relative counter-expectation of ajilu implies that it was expected 
that people (not David) would dance. So surprise at the fact that David's 
sister danced is out of place. 
Cl6: afi/u and davka sound odd in a sentence that expresses a banal 
truth. 
(53a) [gam, *afi/u] lerotii/d yes mi/yon lirot babank. ("[Also, Even] 
Rothchild has a million IL in the bank.") 
(53b) [rak, *davka] /erotiild yei mi/yon lirot babank. ("[Only, Just) 
Rothchild has a million IL in the bank.") 
This effect is due to the relative counter-expectation implicit in afi/u 
and davka. A banal truth is more expected than a non-banal one, but 
relative counter-expectational Rls imply that something is least expected. 
Cl7: An anaphoric demonstrative that serves as the subject in a 
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sentence whose predicate expresses counter-expectation refers to the 
presupposition of a sentence with davka and to the assertion of a sentence 
with another RI. 
(54) A: [davka. afi/u, gam, rakH yosef rakad. ("[Just, Even, Also, 
Onlyil Joseph danced.") 
B: beemet! laze lo cipiti. ("Really! This I did not expect.") 
The demonstrative ze ("this") refers to the presupposition (cf. the 
sentence with davka). 
Cl8: The Hebrew construction that would be analogous to English 
both utilizes two occurrences of gam. 
Note that parallel constructions with rak. afi/u, or davka are not ac-
ceptable: 
(55) [gam, *rak, *afilu, *davka] mose ve-[gam, *rak. *afi/u, *davka] 
dan bau. ("[Both, Only, Even, Just] Moshe [and also, and only, 
and even, and just] Dan came.") 
rak cannot participate in such a construction because of its negative 
range-indication, which would make one part of it contradict the other. 
afi/u and davka are excluded here due to their relative counter· 
expectational consequence, which partially orders the range of the 
predicate. We cannot first state that Moshe's arrival was least expected 
and go on to say that Dan's was least expected. We could say that both 
their arrivals were least expected, but that would be a different sentence. 
It would go: 
(56) [afUu, davka] mose vedan bau. ("[Even, Just] Moshe and Dan 
came.") 
Cl 9: Rls affect conditional sentences in many interesting ways. 
Let us illustrate some of them briefly. It is a general pragmatic 
presupposition that effort is positively associated with success. Hence, 
the acceptability judgments of the sets of examples (57)-(58): 
(57) [gam, afilu, *rak, davkaH im hu yenase hu lo yacliax. ("[Also, 
Even, Only, Just] if he tries he won't succeed.") 
gam and afi/u presuppose that he will try, and assert that despite his 
efforts he will not succeed. davka also presupposes the truth of the antece-
dent, but asserts that because of his efforts he won't succeed, contrary to 
the above-mentioned pragmatic expectation. rak seems questionable 
here: it seems to be a real conditional and seems to carry the stronger 
implication that if he does not try, he will succeed, which contradicts the 
above-mentioned presupposition, as was the case with davka. But rak 
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lacks the inherent modal force of davka which renders it more ap-
propriate for such a refutation. 
Compare the above with {58): 
(58) [rak, *davka, *afilu, *gamjj im hu yena.se hu yacliax. ("[Only, 
Just, Even, Also JI if he tries he will succeed.") 
The acceptability judgments in (58) are reversed from those in (57). 
Since the sentences in (58) reflect the pragmatically "expected" state of 
affairs, no attitude of counter-expectation is compatible with it. rak, 
again, expresses a conditional statement, placing a restriction on its pos-
sible antecedents, and is thus not excluded from (58 ). 
We can generalize and say that if a sentence is in agreement with an 
accepted pragmatic presupposition, or a previously made statement, it 
will exhibit the acceptability judgments of (58) when Rls are inserted. If it 
contradicts a presupposition held to be true by Speaker or Hearer or 
both, then it will exhibit the acceptability judgment of (57). In both cases 
the readings will follow the pattern indicated. 
C20: Rls do not take elements which have undergone the ir-
tran.sformation as their scope constituents. 
This seems to be due to the fact that as logical predicates they single 
out their scope as the focal element, which is just the semantic function of 
the above transformation, so one of them is redundant. Thus: 
(59) ze [*rak, *gam, *afilu, *davka]l mofe ieiavar er haxa/on. ("It's 
[only, also, even, just} Moshe who broke the window.")8 
However, notice that (60) is different with rak: 
(60) A: mi fam? ("Who's there?") 
B: ze [rak, *gam. *davka. *ajiluJ anaxnu. ("It's [only, also, just, 
even]l us.") 
The implication of the sentence with rak is that it is somebody the in-
quirer knows well, and the rak refers to some scale of familiarity or in-
timacy. As was argued in Section 3.2, with reference to numerals, gam 
does not share this semantic function of rak. 
The above discussion concerning the incompatability of Rls with it-
lran.sformalion explains why (62) would not be considered quite ap-
propriate as an answer to ( 61 ): 
(61) mi ze feaxa/ po g/ida? ("Who is it that had ice-cream here'?") 
8. Similarly, Azar (1976) has indicated that the it-transformation in Hebrew is incom-
patible with certain emphatic transformations which have an equivalent semantic function. 
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(62) *mose axal ligam. rak, afilu, davkaH g/ida. ("Moshe had [also, 
only, even, just~ ice-cream.")9 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, S. R. 1972. "How to get even." Language 48:893-906. 
Azar, M. 1976. "The emphatic sentence in modern Hebrew." Studies in 
Modern Hebrew Syntax and Semantics, pp. 209-229. Ed. P. Cole. 
Amsterdam. 
Fillmore, C. J. 1971. "Entailment rules in a semantic theory." Readings in 
the Philosophy of Language, pp. 533-548. Eds. Rosenberg and 
Travis. Englewood Cliffs. 
Fraser, B. 1971. "An analysis of 'even' in English." Studies in Linguistic 
Semantics, pp. 150-178. Eds. Fillmore and Langedoen. New York. 
Green, G. M. 1968. "On too and either, and not just on too and either 
either." Papers from the Fourth Regional Meeting of the Chicago 
Linguistic Society, pp. 22-39. Eds. Darden, Charles, Bailey, and 
Davidson. Cambridge. 
Horn, L. 1969. "A presuppositional analysis of only and even." Papers 
from the Fijih Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 
pp. 98-107. Eds. R. Binnick and W. Abraham. Chicago. 
Katriel, T. 1976. A Semantic Analysis of Set Operators in Natural 
Language. Unpublished M.A. thesis. Haifa University. 
Keenan, E. 1971. "Quantifier structures in English." Foundations of 
Language 7:255-284. 
---. 1973. "Presupposition in Natural Logic." The Monist 
57:344-364. 
Kuroda, S.-Y. 1969. "Remarks on the notion of subject with reference to 
words like also, even or only (part I)." Annual Bu//etin of the 
9. Our semantic analysis, in some of its aspects, is in agreement with, and reinforces, the 
work of Horn (1969), Fillmore (1971), Fraser (1971), Keenan (1971), Anderson (1972), 
Green (1968), and Lakoff(l972) on related expressions in English, and with Kuroda's paper 
( 1969) on Japanese. However, some specific facts concerning the structure of Hebrew, 
notably the lexical form davka as paralleling afilu ("even"), have enabled us to make ad-
ditional observations leading to further generalizations. 
RANGE-INDICATORS 51 
Research Institute of Logopendics and Phoniatrics 3: 111-130. 
University of Tokyo. 
Lakoff, G. 1972. "Linguistics and Natural Logic." Semantics of Natural 
Language, pp. 545-665. Eds. Davidson and Harmon. Dordrecht. 
